Abstract: Drawing on a notable example of a non-Western normative initiative, Brazil's 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP), this article contributes to broadening the scope of the norm dynamics literature beyond its common Western-centric focus. Post-2011 Libya intervention, Brazil proposed RwP to clarify what 'using force' means under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) banner, but then withdrew from visible norm sponsorship, only to return to this as part of a collective exercise to institutionalize R2P at the United Nations. First, the article highlights the significant role of non-Western agents whose contributions usually go overlooked, yet carry the highest potential to address the legitimacy deficit of norms like R2P. Second, the article proposes adding a new conceptual tool when investigating the role of agency in norm dynamics, one that incorporates a wider range of norm 'shaping' processes and highlights enabling, contingent circumstances. The latter, is argued, best captures the anomalies in contemporary norm contestation. This is illustrated through an empirical analysis of the conditions under which Brazil was able to advance RwP, despite the subsequent emergence of unfavourable circumstances. This article emphasizes how significant an alignment of enabling circumstances is to non-Western agents in terms of shaping norm contestation and normative exercise completion.
Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm has been discussed extensively since its initial emergence in the 2001 report on the topic, and especially after 2005, when it was institutionalized at the UN. The UN Secretary-General's 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 1 introduced the 'Three Pillars' approach to R2P, which now informs all debates on this topic meant to shape responses to mass atrocity crimes. The cumulative impact of R2P to date has been dubbed 'the most dramatic normative development of our time', 2 with R2P's main function described as 'a global rallying call to action' in response to mass atrocities.
3
R2P is first and foremost about states' responsibilities to protect their own populations, but it also strengthens the international community's overall responsibility to protect, through the UN, which makes it 'one of the most significant normative shifts in international relations since the creation of the UN in 1945'. 4 As 'an important normative innovation', 5 R2P has evolved rapidly, but it has also generated intense controversy, reflected in a multitude of processes of contestation about the organization responsible for R2P's development, the content of the norm, and especially how best to implement it.
This article's emphasis on a non-Western initiative, meant to reshape and clarify R2P, was triggered by the call to pay greater attention to the agency role of non-Western ideas and actors in building global order. 6 R2P is often wrongly described as a Western-generated norm. As such, this article has two main reasons for examining Brazil's RwP initiative: first, because it represents the normative engagement of a non-Western agent; and second, because and championing norms such as R2P. Non-Western agents' contributions to shaping existing norms usually go overlooked in the norm dynamics literature, despite clear implications for a norm's perceived legitimacy. This section argues that normative initiatives such as Brazil's
RwP have the potential to address the legitimacy deficit of norms such as R2P, and ought to be recognized as such. The analysis is located in the norm dynamics literature, and anchored within the post-positivist constructivist approach that sees a norm's meaning as evolving, and highlights the merits of contestation. The second section reflects this article's theoretical contribution toward broadening the framework of agency to recognize the significant role of contingent circumstances in shaping norm contestation, especially in the case of non-Western agents. Assigning an explanatory share to the specifics of a particularly enabling social context in which an agent operates best captures the anomalies in contemporary norm contestation. Indeed, RwP highlights the need to incorporate a wider range of norm 'shaping'
processes and emphasizes agency contingent upon a specific context -or a unique set of circumstances -in which 'norm shapers' like Brazil operate at a given time.
Pinpointing the Importance of non-Western Agency
The theoretical and empirical research into the causes and consequences of norm diffusion has flourished in the International Relations discipline. For the most part, however, the literature focuses on certain types of norm dynamics, which makes constructivism literature towards focusing on the role of Western actors as norm entrepreneurs 12 is apparent.
Where R2P and RwP Fit within Norm Dynamics Theorizing
The literature on the Responsibility to Protect has expanded exponentially in the last fifteen years. Consensus seems to have emerged among scholars conducting R2P-related research that constructivism provides one of the most appropriate frameworks to explore its progress to date. It is important to assess how R2P, understood as a social norm, 13 shapes international politics. More recent research on R2P describes it as a 'complex norm', 14 covering several prescriptions, the most controversial of which pertains to the use of force under R2P's Pillar
Three.
15
As a 'principle norm' 16 , R2P has been refined through UN resolutions, reports, and
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Several IR scholars discuss the discipline's Western-centrism, for example Acharya, 'Dialogue and Discovery'; Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever (eds. R2P's Pillar Three refers to the responsibility of the international community to respond, collectively, when states 'manifestly fail' to protect their populations, through a range of political, economic, and military tools. The use of force is, therefore, one option available in the Pillar Three toolkit. 16 See Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard, 'Introduction' and 'Conclusions' in Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard (eds.) Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). complex institutionalization and implementation processes. R2P also went through endless processes of contestation, making it a classic example of a contested norm. 17 Such processes of contestation capture this article's aim to advance the scholarship that explores how non-Western agents shape norms within the structures of the 'liberal international order ' . 18 And it is precisely the interactions between Western and non-Western norm makers, takers and shapers that are under-explored in the relevant literature. The article aims to address this shortcoming by contributing to the development of what has been described as the 'third wave' 19 of scholarship on the dynamics of norm diffusion. The first wave of norm dynamics research depicts Western agents as norm makers, and norms as stable in terms of content. According to the famous life-cycle model set out by Finnemore and Sikkink, a norm passes through successive stages during which its meaning is clarified, it becomes institutionalized, and ultimately enters the phases of norm 'cascade' and 'diffusion', the latter occurring when states act on its prescriptions. 20 These models of norm diffusion that adhere to linear approaches to norm development end with a norm's internalization. It is assumed that after institutionalization, a norm's meaning becomes fixed, and the norm itself acquires a 'taken-for-granted quality', which shapes actors' behaviour. 21 Such models treat a norm's content as static, which is problematic because this ignores the shifts and changes in a norm's content over time. They also neglect the influence of pre-existing norms at the A norm shaper engages in constructive contestation to influence the development and evolution of an existing norm toward a framing of this norm that is more aligned with its own values and interests, via several concomitant processes necessary to surpass structural obstacles. This is short of innovating or creating new norms, which is the function of norm entrepreneurs. 57 RwP did not bring any novel elements into the R2P debate. All the points in the initial concept paper on RwP and subsequent statements had been mentioned before, either in the ICISS report or in the various iterations in which R2P was embraced at the UN.
What was new, and contributed toward advancing R2P, was Brazil's willingness to gather all these elements under a novel banner that resonated with non-Western interests, and its peace and security concerns. 60 Most commentators suggest that Brazil became more engaged in security issues as a result of its desire to acquire a seat in a reformed Security Council.
Some, however, argue that Brazil's engagement with R2P goes decades back to its broader desire to regulate the use of force and power in the international system, which preceded its Security Council aspirations. 61 In the early 2000s, Brazil was reluctant to embrace R2P not because of the idea of international responsibility per se but because of how it related to the UN Security Council, which Brasilia saw as the only authority in matters related to collective security.
62
The one exception to Brazil's overall reluctance to engage in UN peacekeeping RwP's goal as a constructive contribution to the R2P debate. While Brazilian diplomats still 72 Ibid. Point 11(a)-(i), which sums up the substance of the 'responsibility while protecting' proposal, emphasizes: (a) the importance of preventive diplomacy; (b) the need 'to exhaust all peaceful means available in the protection of civilians'; (c) the right authority, with the use of force authorized by the Security Council or by the General Assembly in exceptional circumstances; (d) that authorized military action 'must abide by the letter and the spirit of the mandate conferred by the Security Council'; (e) the proportionality of means; (f) the judicious and proportionate use of force, which is 'limited to the objectives established by the Security Council'; and (g) that guidelines 'must be observed through the entire length …'. Point 11 also stresses the need for (h) 'enhanced Security Council procedures…to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are monitored and interpreted', and (i) the Council to ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force'. constituencies. In the words of the same Western diplomat whose country was part of this cross-regional group, Brazil 'was a very important part of this initiative.'
Despite the failure of the cross-regional group to produce a GA resolution on R2P adopted by consensus at the 71 st session of the UNGA, Brazil's active engagement behind closed doors to ensure RwP-alike provisions make it into the draft resolution reflects significant shaping efforts. As Betts and Orchard note, institutionalization, in this case via a less formal process at the UN, does not necessary mean 'a moment of triumph for norms.'
81
An exclusive focus on the final product, in this case a consensually adopted UNGA resolution on R2P to celebrate the norm's tenth anniversary at the UN, would render Brazil's shaping efforts from the last year invisible. Brazilian diplomats disregarded calls for producing more concept papers on RwP. They argued that 'the R2P debate is not evolving through one 
Increasing the Legitimacy of R2P
New norms are more likely to spread if the responsibility for their creation and promotion is more broadly shared.
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Brazil's proposal to refine R2P is significant precisely because it shares this responsibility, through legitimately claiming agency in developing and championing protection norms, to better reflect its own values and interests. Brazil's RwP initiative shows that non-Western actors can have a strong voice in a realm that was, until recently, seen as the exclusive domain of Western powers. Despite its unique status as a norm shaper on such an important global issue, Brazil has not projected a uniform practice of pushing forward the central elements that motivated the RwP initiative in the first place. This is understandable, since Brazil is still acquiring the skills needed to succeed in navigating stormy cross-regional waters at the UN, especially when their normative exercise applies to two very controversial issues: first, the use of force, and second, the most protracted of all possible reforms, the reform of the Security Council and its working methods.
After RwP, Brazil was invited in 2015 to join a cross-regional group co-sponsoring a GA resolution on R2P precisely because of its perceived aura of enhancing the legitimacy of 90 See, for instance, Acharya, 'The R2P and Norm Diffusion', p. 466. agreement on Pillar Three interpretation -was able to achieve consensus. RwP clearly informed this effort, especially in terms of spelling out the practical mechanisms to identify the best ways to respond to R2P situations. The fact that R2P was not officially added to the formal agenda of the UNGA in September 2016 and that the GA resolution did not materialize in time for the 71 st session of the UNGA does not diminish the legitimacy of this exercise. However, the timeline of Brazil's efforts to shape R2P suggests that it initiated RwP and then seemingly withdrew from pursuing a more impactful norm sponsorship strategy, other than its participation in the cross-regional group that worked on the potential UNGA resolution. Explaining the changes in Brazil's push for RwP poses an intriguing theoretical conundrum, since previous scholarship does not account for the anomalies seen in such norm shaping exercises. To answer this, it is important to pay rigorous attention to the role of contingent circumstances in non-Western norm shaping exercises. The fact that contingency matters is not a novel finding in constructivist literature. 105 However, what is argued here is that the ability of non-traditional, non-Western agents to shape norms and their subsequent degree of success is conditioned by an enabling set of contingent circumstances, at particular moments in time. While contingency also matters to Western agents, the fact that norm-shaping is not something non-Western agents are known for, or expected to contribute to, makes contingent circumstances even more critical for this category of norm shapers. One can find examples of Western states whose promotion of R2P in particular has also been circumstantial.
Accounting for Changes in
Brazil's RwP aimed to reshape an international norm (R2P) it perceived as 'generally good' but not completely in line with local interests, in order to 'realign' R2P's Pillar Three with its traditional foreign policy objectives -clearly engaging in 'localization' 108 efforts.
These objectives resonate with local priors which emphasize prevention, criteria for the application of coercive interventions, and limit the use of force. Brazil's intention with the RwP concept paper was to make R2P compatible with its interests, and reflective of its commitments to ideas of universal justice, international order, and accountability for all. As a Brazilian diplomat noted, RwP's goal was to emphasize that any R2P-related action was always fully aligned with the UN Charter and respect for the multilateral system. RwP also reflects a form of agency Acharya calls 'subsidiarity', which is more outward-looking, and occurs when agents (usually weaker states, or in this case, non-Western agents) reshape a norm whose integrity is at risk because of 'more powerful central actors'' attempts to marginalize or abuse it. 109 It was the perceived abuse in terms of pursuing regime change in Libya that triggered Brazil's constructive contestation. Indeed, RwP was about criticizing an approach Brazil regarded as 'unsatisfactory because it relied too much on the use of military force (without a thorough consideration of potentially negative consequences using force could have on the country and the region), and about proposing some alternatives'. provided by Security Council membership, can complement discussions on norm contestation by providing the tools for tracing the processes through which change occurred.
As a non-Western norm shaper, Brazil is not used to 'shaping' the UN discourse on issues like the use of force, which are generally adjudicated to powerful Western states, and especially to the P5 members of the Security Council. According to practice theory, competence is required to practice in a certain area; however, competence is not intrinsic but ascribed through social relations. thoroughly explained how agents exercise institutional power mainly through their roles in the UN Security Council. 135 There are, of course, differences between the institutional roles played by the P5 and those of the non-permanent members of the Security Council.
Nevertheless, Brazil's seat in the Council provided the country with sufficient clout to position itself as a norm shaper, and to operate through diffuse channels and interactions.
Also noteworthy is the fact that all the BRICS were in the Security Council at the same time (China and Russia among the P5; Brazil, India, and South Africa as non-permanent members). Brazil's end of term as an elected member of the Security Council meant that the institutional power it exercised while on the Council -a critically enabling factordisappeared. Brazil lost its ability to exercise normative influence and to impact decisionmaking on the topic. According to a Brazilian diplomat, after leaving the UN Security Council, Brazil was no longer in a position to have its voice heard as loudly and to influence how matters related to international peace and security are shaped normatively.
139 Once
Brazil lost its institutional power, it became much more difficult to engage actively in negotiations on the use of military force, and to lament about the lack of accountability which becomes problematic when allocating R2P's Pillar Three collective responsibility to the Security Council. These issues, however, became the most controversial items during negotiations on the text of a UNGA resolution on R2P, especially surrounding operative paragraphs 12 and 13 of this draft resolution, which reiterate how R2P 'must be implemented responsibly' and the importance of 'monitoring implementation and reviewing progress'. It should come as no surprise that these elements, which Brazil insisted on being included in the text of the resolution, were not favoured by the P5 since they impose limits on the Security Council. 140 At this point, the US, in particular, has been critical of Brazil for several years.
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The three enabling circumstances discussed here allowed Brazil to flourish, initially, as a norm shaper, but they also help explain its subsequent withdrawal from visible norm sponsorship. This calls for recognizing something hitherto overlooked by norm diffusion scholarship, namely a form of agency that manifests itself in a specific institutional context and takes advantage of a particularly enabling set of circumstances to make its message heard. Brazil's example suggests that an agent engages in refining and reshaping an existing norm once certain circumstances present themselves. In the case of RwP, it was a combination of a very specific context in which Brazil operated at that time, which included non-permanent membership status in the Security Council, and a committed norm entrepreneur, then Foreign Minister Patriota, who was the driving force behind Brazil's reshaping efforts, until the domestic political turmoil commenced. The enabling institutional context played a major role in Brazil's contributions to R2P. The end of its term on the Council is key in explaining Brazil's change of behaviour toward less visible agency.
Conclusion
Through RwP, Brazil voiced the concerns of many states, the BRICS in particular, prompted by the implementation of 2011 NATO's mandate in Libya. This article argued that the voice 140 As suggested in several interviews, UK and USA were not on board and saw no particular value in having such a UNGA resolution on R2P, passing by consensus, interviews with diplomats from several Western and non-Western Permanent Missions, New York, June, July 2016.
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It didn't help that Brazil voted in 2010 against a resolution on Iran the USA fought hard for.
of non-Western actors is becoming significant in shaping existing norms, and that Brazil has played a critical and prototypical role in taking such an initiative, despite the emergence of unfavourable circumstances. In doing so, the article highlights the agency, and importance, of non-Western actors in shaping global norms, and in infusing them with legitimacy. The latter captures the significance for norm dynamics theory, in that non-Western agents'
contributions carry the highest potential to address the legitimacy deficit of norms like R2P. RwP has already broadened the legitimacy of R2P, together with its appeal.
